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Abstract
This paper describes a model of dynamic decision making in the Dynamic Stocks and
Flows (DSF) task, developed using the ACT-R cognitive architecture. This task is a simple
simulation of a water tank in which the water level must be kept constant whilst the inow
and outow changes at varying rates. The basic functions of the model are based around
three steps. Firstly, the model predicts the water level in the next cycle by adding the
current water level to the predicted net inow of water. Secondly, based on this projection,
the net outow of the water is adjusted to bring the water level back to the target. Thirdly,
the predicted net inow of water is adjusted to improve its accuracy in the future. If the
prediction has overestimated net inow then it is reduced, if it has underestimated net
inow it is increased. The model was entered into a model comparison competition|the
Dynamic Stocks and Flows Challenge|to model human performance on four conditions of
the DSF task and then subject the model to testing on ve unseen transfer conditions. The
model reproduced the main features of the development data reasonably well but did not
reproduce human performance well under the transfer conditions. This suggests that the
principles underlying human performance across the dierent conditions dier considerably
despite their apparent similarity. Further lessons for the future development of our model
and model comparison challenges are considered.
Keywords: ACT-R, Cognitive Architecture, DSF, Dynamic Decision Making.
1. Dynamic decision making
The term Dynamic decision making (DDM) covers a wide range of relatively complex
cognitive tasks in which people must make a number of decisions over a period of time
in a changing task environment. Environmental changes can depend on the structure of
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the environment itself, on decisions made by the decision maker or, most typically, some
combination of the two (Brehmer, 1992; Edwards, 1962). Many real-world tasks require
some form of DDM, ranging from game playing and car driving to patient care management,
military battleeld strategy and economic market analysis.
Experimental studies of DDM have typically taken the form of simulated task
environments in which participants are required to monitor certain states of the environment
(often represented numerically or graphically) and maintain or optimise the value of one
or more other states over a period of time (see Gonzalez, Vanyukanov, and Martin, 2005,
for a review). Results from such studies have shown that people typically nd such tasks
challenging and often perform sub-optimally (e.g., Brehmer and Allard, 1991; Kleinmuntz
and Thomas, 1987; Sterman, 1989).
There have been several proposed explanations for observed sub-optimal behaviour
which fall roughly into three categories. The rst argue that sub-optimal performance
can result from constraints on processing imposed by the structure or properties of the
cognitive system itself, such as working memory capacity. For example, in an early study of
human DDM ability, Rapoport (1966) was able to account for sub-optimal performance with
a model that assumed people had limited capacity to plan ahead. More recently, Gonzalez,
Thomas, and Vanyukov (2005) found positive correlations between performance on three
DDM tasks and score on the Visual-Span Test measure of working memory capacity (Shah
and Miyake, 1996) and the Raven Progressive Matrices measure of uid intelligence (Raven,
1962, 1977).
An alternative explanation for sub-optimal performance is that people construct
incomplete or incorrect mental models of the task (e.g., Besnard, Greathead, and Baxter,
2004; Brehmer, 1992; Sterman, 1994). Problem solvers are assumed to construct a mental
model prior to, and during the course of, interacting with a task environment, which consists
of a representation of the relevant variables, their given properties and relationships, and
hypotheses about relationships not given. Dynamic decision environments vary in terms
of their complexity (e.g., the number of interacting elements and the functions underlying
their interactions) and opacity (the degree to which elements and their relationships are
hidden from the problem solver) which aects the accuracy and completeness of any mental
models constructed. In addition, mental models about hidden relationships may have to be
constructed using limited feedback information from one or two observed variables.
The third proposal is that sub-optimal performance results from sub-optimal strategies
employed by problem solvers. A number of studies have shown, for example, that problem
solving performance is related to the systematicity of the exploration strategy adopted,
with more systematic strategies (i.e., exploring the properties of individual variables
consecutively) resulting in richer structural knowledge and better performance (e.g., Putz-
Osterloh, 1993; Vollmeyer, Burns, and Holyoak, 1996).
Of course, these factors are not mutually exclusive and are bound to be related; problem
solvers' strategies are more likely to be incorrect if they have inappropriate mental models
of the task. The complex interaction of factors makes attempting to provide mechanistic,
computational accounts of human DDM behaviour challenging if structural knowledge,
strategic knowledge, learning and cognitive architectural constraints are all to be taken
into account.
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One promising|and increasingly popular|way to formulate hypotheses about the
cognitive representations and processes involved in DDM is to construct task models in a
cognitive architecture. Cognitive architectures are computational theories of the large-scale
structure of the mind; how cognition is controlled and how knowledge is encoded, stored,
retrieved and utilised. There is a wide variety of cognitive architectures in existence, with
dierent representational and processing assumptions, and (to a greater or lesser extent)
informed by psychological theory. The advantage of many of these theories is that they
are implemented as software systems in which task models can be specied and tested by
running simulations and comparing model output with human data.
Currently all of the most prominent symbolic architectures (e.g., ACT-R (Anderson et
al., 2004; Anderson, 2007), EPIC (Meyer and Kieras, 1997), and Soar (Laird, Newell, and
Rosenbloom, 1997)) are built around some form of production system, a computational
formalism that has been used to account for performance in DDM tasks for a number of
years (e.g., Anzai, 1984). The architectures agree on other issues in addition to this common
processing mechanism but also dier in terms of their assumptions concerning matters such
as memory representation, conict resolution, serial versus parallel processing etc.
The benet of using cognitive architectures to model human performance in DDM tasks
is that they allow one to specify the internal model of the dynamic system assumed to
be held by the problem solver, the strategy being adopted and the precise nature of the
computational processes being carried out on environmental information. All cognitive
architectures incorporate one or more learning mechanisms while some (ACT-R and EPIC
for example) are also highly constrained by psychological theories of learning, memory and
visual processing and so provide more plausible accounts of human data. In the following
section we provide a brief overview of ACT-R, the architecture employed in this study.
1.1 The ACT-R cognitive architecture
ACT-R is the current version of a proposed unied theory of cognition (Newell, 1990)
developed by John Anderson and his colleagues over a period of 30 years (Anderson et al.,
2004; Anderson, 2007). It consists of a set of independent modules that acquire information
from the environment, process information and execute motor actions in the furtherance of
particular goals. Figure 1 illustrates the main components of the architecture. There are
four modules that comprise the central cognitive components of ACT-R. Two of these are
memory stores for two types of knowledge: a declarative memory module that stores factual
knowledge about the domain, and a procedural memory module that stores the system's
knowledge about how tasks are performed. The former consists of a network of knowledge
chunks while the latter is a set of production rules of the form \IF <condition> THEN
<action>": the condition specifying chunks that must be present for the rule to apply and
the action specifying the actions to be taken should this occur.
Two further cognitive modules represent information related to the execution of tasks; a
control state module keeps track of the intentions of the system and a problem state module
maintains the current state of the task during problem solving.
In addition to the cognitive modules, four perceptual-motor modules for speech,
audition, visual and motor processing encode perceptual information from the environment
and enact speech or motor output. The visual and motor modules (shown in Figure 1)
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Figure 1: The modular structure of ACT-R 6.0
provide ACT-R with the ability to simulate visual attention shifts to objects on a computer
display and manual interactions with a computer keyboard and mouse.
Each of ACT-R's modules has an associated buer that can hold only one chunk of
information from its module at a time and the contents of all of the buers constitute
the state of an ACT-R model at any one time. Cognition proceeds via a pattern
matching process that attempts to nd production rules with conditions that match the
current contents of the buers. When a match is found, the production \res" and the
actions (visual or manual movements, requests for the retrieval of a knowledge chunk from
declarative memory, or modications to buers) are performed. Then the matching process
continues on the updated contents of the buers so that tasks are performed through a
succession of production rule rings.
The processing in ACT-R's modules is serial but the modules run in parallel so that
the system can move visual attention while also moving the mouse and attempting to
retrieve knowledge from declarative memory. ACT-R processes also have associated latency
parameters taken from the psychology literature. For example, it typically takes 50 ms for
a production to re and the time taken to move the mouse cursor to an object on the
computer screen is calculated using Fitts' Law (Fitts, 1954).
In addition to these symbolic level mechanisms, ACT-R also incorporates a subsymbolic
(i.e., numerical) level of computations that govern memory retrieval and production rule
selection. The retrieval mechanism is based on the notion of activation; a chunk in
declarative memory has a level of activation which determines its availability for retrieval,
the level of which reects the recency and frequency of its use. This allows models to
account for widely observed recency and frequency eects on retrieval and forgetting.
Subsymbolic computations also govern the probability of productions being selected in
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the conict resolution process. At its most simple, it is assumed that people choose the
most ecient actions (i.e., those that maximise the probability of achieving the goal in
the shortest amount of time). In addition, the more often a production is involved in the
successful achievement of a goal, the more likely it will be selected in the future.
ACT-R can be used to implement several dierent modelling paradigms (see Taatgen,
Lebiere, and Anderson, 2006, for a review) and is the basis for the instance based learning
theory (IBLT) model of DDM (Gonzalez, Lerch, and Lebiere, 2003; Martin, Gonzalez, and
Lebiere, 2004). In the following sections we describe the dynamic stocks and ows DDM
task and then a proposed ACT-R model of the task.
2. The DSF task and challenge
The DSF challenge was to create a cognitive model of a DDM task, and then compare the
performance of this model against human performance in ve experimental conditions that
were not revealed to the competitors until the models had been submitted. The motivation
behind this challenge was to stimulate a comparison between dierent cognitive models
and architectures in order to identify their strengths and weaknesses, an approach that has
been successfully applied previously (Gluck and Pew, 2005). To do this a task was required
which would provide a rich testbed for complex cognition but also lend itself to a range of
cognitive modelling approaches. A DDM task was chosen to t these criteria.
The DDM task used in the challenge was the dynamic stocks and ows (DSF) task
(Dutt and Gonzalez, 2007; Gonzalez and Dutt, 2007). This task is designed to investigate
how people manage stocks and ows in a changing environment and takes the form of a
\microworld" (Gonzalez, Vanyukanov, and Martin, 2005; Gray, 2002) comprised of simple
components. These are: the level of stock (S ) within the system; an inow which increases
the stock; and an outow which decreases the stock. The inow and outow are both
comprised of an environmental component, which is determined by the system (EI and
EO respectively), and a user component, which is determined by the participant (UI and
UO respectively). Therefore participants have partial control over the inow and outow
of stock. The stock simulated in the task is water. Water ows into the tank at a rate
determined by EI and UI, and ows out again at a rate determined by EO and UO. The
stock level at time t is dened by
St = St 1 + [EIt 1 + UIt 1]  [EOt 1 + UOt 1] + SLt 1 d (1)
where SL is the supply line and d is the delay in the supply line so that changes to UI and
UO have an eect on the system only after a certain time period rather than immediately.
The goal of the task is to maintain the amount of water in the tank at a specic level whilst
the rate of water ow in and out changes over time.
There were two factors in this task which were controlled by the challengers to create a
number of dierent conditions. These were (a) the changing rate of environmental ow into
the tank, and (b) the delay between the UI and UO and their eect on the system. Both
of these factors were manipulated in the challenge. Human data from two experiments in
which participants carried out the four conditions of the DSF task (Dutt and Gonzalez, 2007;
Gonzalez and Dutt, 2007) were made available when the challenge was initially announced as
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a basis for model development, (henceforth referred to here as the development conditions).
Each of the four conditions ran for 100 time periods and had a dierent rate of EI:
1. Linear increasing (0:08 (TimePeriod) + 2),
2. Linear decreasing (0:08 (TimePeriod  1) + 10),
3. Nonlinear increasing (5 log(TimePeriod))
4. Nonlinear decreasing (5 log(101  TimePeriod)).
The mean human (and model) performance data are shown in Figure 2. Note that to
facilitate comparison between the observed and model data for the dierent conditions, the
upper range of each y axis has been adjusted to t the maximum value.
The data reveal that people are generally able to maintain the tank at, or close to, the
goal level after an initial learning period of varying length where the tank level is above the
desired level. The data also show that for both linear and nonlinear cases, individuals learn
to control the system more quickly for the positive functions than the negative ones (Dutt
and Gonzalez, 2007).
3. An ACT-R model of the DSF task
From an analysis of the human performance data, we identied a number of key features
which we assumed could be relevant for the development of a cognitive model. The rst,
previously noted by the challenge organisers (e.g., Dutt and Gonzalez, 2007), is that control
over the system gradually improves over the rst ten to thirty time periods to a state where
accuracy levels are relatively stable and tank levels are generally close to target.
It is reasonable to assume that in the early time periods people are learning how
the system operates and making initial hypotheses about the relationships between the
variables. Once subjects have constructed a mental representation of the system, the
monotonic and incremental nature of the functions means that subjects are generally able to
maintain the tank at the target level (although close examination of individual performance
proles revealed substantial individual dierences in the time taken to achieve and sustain
target tank levels). The second feature of the data from the early time periods (particularly
in the decreasing conditions) is that the tank is overfull and that subjects must reduce
rather than increase the level to the target.
One cause of overlling is if the amount of EI is underestimated, which leads to an
underestimate in the UO necessary to stabilise the water level. One plausible explanation
for this underestimate lies in the initial assumptions that participants make when starting
the task. There are few cues in the DSF task environment about what the inow is likely
to be. At the rst time period participants know only that the current water level is 0, the
target level is 4 and, crucially, that the scale on the display used to indicate water level runs
from 0 to 10. This nal observation provides parameters for the likely water level because
it is reasonable (although in this case incorrect) to assume that the display will be designed
to show likely water levels.
In the decreasing conditions, EI in the rst time period lls the tank completely. Unless
UO is set to remove almost all of this water, the tank will overow in the second time
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Figure 2: Observed and ACT-R model performance in the DSF development conditions.
period. Thus, the expectations set by the experiment lead to an underestimate of the
initial levels of EI in the decreasing conditions. These assumptions are not faulty in the
increasing conditions in which the initial EI is around 2, a more reasonable gure to expect
if you are assuming the approximate level will be between 0 and 10. On this basis, it is
reasonable to expect that the decreasing conditions will initially overow considerably as EI
is higher than expected whereas the increasing conditions will not as EI is not unexpectedly
high. Further, a greater overlling would be expected in the nonlinear decreasing condition
because EI remains higher for longer. The patterns of data shown in Figure 2 support
these explanations.
We also suggest that the tank level range in the DSF display may also contribute to
an explanation of why participants were generally slow to react to the high water levels
by failing to increase the user outow suciently (it typically takes subjects between ten
to thirty time periods to reduce the level to the target value). As noted above, the DSF
display runs from zero to ten and any level of water above ten is simply displayed as a full
tank. When this occurs therefore, participants are unable to use this visual cue to obtain
information about the water level in the tank. This may lead them simply to keep increasing
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the value of UO until the level goes below ten or learn to attend to the less salient numeric
tank level display. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that it may take more than the
evidence of one or two time periods for participants to adjust their faulty assumptions.
The basis of the model then is that participants learn the EI based on the amount of
water owing into the tank. They initially underestimate what this level will be however,
and are slow to adjust their estimates in the direction of the correct value. This explanation
accounts for the main features of the group level data in the development conditions.
4. Assumptions of the model
The DSF task environment presents six variables to the problem solver: Environmental
Inow (EI), Environmental Outow (EO), User Inow (UI), User Outow (UO), Current
tank Level (CL) and Goal Level (GL). These are presented to cognitive models directly as
numerical values over a socket connection.
Our ACT-R model of the DSF task consists of a set of eleven ACT-R production rules.
Figure 3 displays the productions (shown as rectangles) and the ow of control between
them. The model assumes that four items of declarative knowledge are maintained and
employed in carrying out the task: (a) the estimated net environmental input to the tank,
(b) the current dierence (dc) between the actual and target tank levels, (c) the previous
dierence (dp) between the actual and target tank levels in the previous trial, and (d) the
rate of change (m) of the adjustment for the estimated net environmental change.
The strategy embodied by the model can be divided into three main steps. In the rst
step the model estimates the net environmental input for the next time period, based on the
accuracy of the prediction for the previous one. For each time period, the estimate for the
net environmental input in the following time period is the current net environmental input
plus the model's estimate of the change in the net environmental input. This estimated
change is the dierence between the current tank level and the target level (i.e., the error
in the previous prediction) multiplied by the model's estimate of the rate at which the net
environmental input is changing. These estimates are carried out by the test dierence
production.
The model assumes that problem solvers must attempt to keep a track of how the net
environmental input is progressing over time periods so that the rate at which the net user
change (UI   UO) changes can be kept the same as m. A major component of the model,
therefore is the mechanism to adjust the estimated rate at which the net environmental
input is changing at each time period, mt. If dc is greater than dp, then the rate of the
net user change is insucient (i.e., EI and EO are changing faster than the estimate).
Therefore the model's estimate of m must be increased so that the net user change is
adjusted in line with the actual changes to EI and EO. Specically, the rate of change is
increased according to how much more dc is greater than dp. A large relative increase leads
to a large increase in rate of change and so on, calculated according to the equation
mt+1 = mt + 
jdcj+ jdpj
jdcj : (2)
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Figure 3: Control ow of the model.
where  is a parameter representing an estimate of people's accuracy at adjusting the rate
of change. If  = 1 then the model's adjustment is perfect whereas a value of 0:5 was found
to capture the human data well by under-adjusting the rate of change.
In the second step (implemented by the four ROC productions), the model calculates
the rate of change according to the relationship between the current dierence and that from
the previous time period. If the current dierence is greater than the previous dierence the
rate of change is increased accordingly. Alternatively, if the dierence is decreasing (either
positively or negatively), the model decreases the rate of change in proportion whereas
if the dierence is constant then the model keeps the current rate of change constant.
An additional production was also added to manage situations where the rate of change
uctuates either side of the goal. In this case the dierence between the current and target
levels is not a reliable indicator of the accuracy of the previous estimate and the rate of
change is reduced to prevent an ever-increasing rate of change.
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In the third step the model predicts the next tank level by adding the net environmental
input to the current tank level (the add net input production). Once this has been estimated,
the model then simply adjusts UI or UO by the dierence between the predicted next level
and the target level to bring the level to the target. This is handled by three compare
productions, which re depending on the relative values of the predicted and target levels.
Finally the execute sends the decision to the DSF simulation.
The three-step process can be further illustrated by an example. For a particular time
period, t, if the current tank level is 6, the target level is 4, and the current estimate of the
rate of change, mt = 1, then dc = 2 and the model computes the net environmental input
as mt  dc = 2. In addition, assuming dp = 1 then the error in the model's prediction is
increasing so the model adjusts its estimate of the rate of change mt+1 to be 1+0:5
j2j+j1j
j2j =
1:75 (as the size of the dierence has increased across time periods so has the model's
estimate of the rate of change).
The predicted level for t + 1 therefore is the current level plus the net environmental
input (6+2 = 8). The model will then compensate for this predicted discrepancy by setting
UI = 0 and UO = 8  4 = 4).
As can be seen in Figure 2, the performance of the model in the four development
conditions is reasonably close to that of the human experiment participants. The goodness-
of-t measures used for the challenge (R2 and RMSE ) for the model are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: R2 and RMSE goodness-of-t measures for the ACT-R model on the four
development conditions
Development Condition
Error Linear Inc. Linear Dec. Nonlinear Inc. Nonlinear Dec.
R2 0.63 0.67 0.26 0.74
RMSE 0.34 2.97 1.06 3.7
5. Testing the model
The DSF challenge was designed not simply to test models' ability to account for the
given data sets but primarily to test their ability to predict new, unseen data sets from
ve dierent conditions of the DSF task after they bad been constructed. No information
about the nature of these new transfer conditions was made available during the model
construction phase. The stated aim of this approach was that, because model performance
in the test phase could not be modied by hand, to predict the transfer data accurately,
models must capture general principles governing human performance in the DSF task
rather than specic features of a single condition or data set.
The ve conditions against which the submitted models were tested were not simple
variations of these, such as dierent linear or nonlinear functions; they were qualitatively
dierent. Three conditions manipulated EI according to a repeated sequence for the 100
trials:
1. S2. EI is the sequence 1; 5.
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2. S21. EI is the sequence 11; 51, with 1 noise being distributed equally amongst
trials.
3. S4. EI is the sequence 0; 4; 2; 6.
The two other transfer conditions manipulated the delay between the submission of
users' UI and UO decision and its execution:
1. D2. UI and UO decisions were delayed until the trial after submission.
2. D3. UI and UO decisions were delayed until two trials after submission.
Both delay conditions started with 4 gallons of water, a goal level of 6, and EO set at 0.
The EI function was a linear increasing function that deposited water into the tank from
2 to 10 gallons over the course of 100 trials.
The human and model data for the ve transfer conditions are displayed in Figure 4.
Note that, as in Figure 2, the upper range of each y axis has been adjusted to aid comparison.
In this case, the upper bound has been set to allow a reasonable display of the pattern of
values, even if this required omitting extreme cases. The R2 and RMSE goodness-of-t
measures for the model are shown in Table 2.
There are a number of comments to make about the data in Figure 4. Firstly, it can be
seen that the human data does not resemble that from the development conditions but varies
widely between transfer conditions. Overall, subjects performed less well in all ve transfer
conditions than in the development ones, most likely because the underlying functions were
less easy to discern. This could be because, unlike the relatively simple monotonic functions
in the development conditions in which only the rate and direction of EI was manipulated,
the transfer functions were either non-monotonic, contained noise, aected the control of
the system, or required the taking of several time periods into account.
Although there is some degree of similarity between the patterns in the three sequence
conditions, they dier considerably from the two delay conditions. All three sequence
conditions display a regular \saw tooth" pattern reecting the repeated sequence pattern
and a general overlling of the tank. The S2 condition does show a pattern of overlling and
then stabilising like the development conditions (although with less accuracy as it overlls
every other time) whereas S2  1 displays a series of over-corrections in which the tank is
overlled but never stabilises. The S4 condition also appears to be overlled but moving
towards stabilising towards the goal level to some extent, although very slowly so that the
target is not achieved before the end of the experiment. In addition, it seems that the tank
overlls every time there is a large input.
Human performance was somewhat similar for the D2 and D3 conditions; both show
an overlled tank with a series of over-corrections, the pattern being more varied and less
accurate in the latter.
The model did not capture human performance in any of the ve transfer conditions very
well. For all three sequence conditions the tank level tended to oscillate around the correct
with periods of large over-correction. Model performance in the delay conditions was also
quite dissimilar to human data. In the D2 condition, model performance matches human
performance very closely for the rst 15 time periods but then the tank level increases
11
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(d) Delay 2
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(e) Delay 3
Figure 4: Observed and ACT-R model performance in the DSF transfer conditions.
rapidly and never returns to normal levels. In the D3 condition, the model is able to
perform in a similar fashion to the development conditions, showing the familiar pattern of
overlling and then stabilising at the correct value. However, this is not what people do.
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Table 2: R2 and RMSE goodness-of-t measures for the ACT-R model on the ve test
conditions
Test Condition
Error S2 S2  1 S4 D2 D3
R2 0.16 0.4 0.5 0.02 0.11
RMSE 0.96 0.38 0.59 0.53 1.25
We are unable to provide a general explanation of the model's behaviour in the transfer
conditions or more specically for the delay conditions other than to assume that it has
something to do with the fact that the model only takes the previous trial into account when
adjusting the estimated rate at which the net environmental input is changing at each time
period. For several of these conditions, it may be the case that accurate prediction relies
on the encoding and integration of information from a number of previous trials.
6. Conclusions
The process of developing a cognitive model of a complex task is challenging if one seeks to
generate accurate ts to human data over a wide range of dierent task scenarios. It requires
deep insights into the three factors that have been identied as aecting performance: the
strategy or strategies employed, the various constraints imposed by the cognitive system,
and the task representations constructed and used by the problem solver. The ACT-R
cognitive architecture is well suited for modelling such tasks because it combines a symbolic
level for modelling knowledge structures and strategic, decision making processes with a
subsymbolic level for modelling constraints such as working memory capacity, learning and
forgetting rates etc.
It is not necessary to use all of the available mechanisms in ACT-R however and in
developing this model we have chosen to focus exclusively on the strategic processes. In
terms of the space of possible models therefore, the model is relatively minimal and abstract;
it is essentially an implementation of a relatively high-level specication of the strategy
we hypothesised subjects employed. We did not utilise ACT-R's subsymbolic learning or
memory retrieval mechanisms, nor did we model the details of the various calculations
that were required. To the extent that the model captured the given data however, we
can say that the assumptions of the model were supported. We believe that the algorithm
suggested may well lie at the core of a more sophisticated and elaborate model that captures
the human data more closely|from the developmental conditions at least.
There are several possible options for making the model more complex. For example,
during each trial of the task, the current model creates a single declarative knowledge
structure containing the four required items of knowledge and maintains them in ACT-R's
imaginal buer throughout the trial. The model therefore is not required to retrieve any
of this knowledge during the trial or seek it from the environment as part of a strategy
or if a retrieval failure occurs. Although this is convenient and sucient for our current
purposes, it no doubt glosses over possibly important processes and a more detailed model
would probably represent these knowledge elements separately (in the current model, if the
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chunk is forgotten then all four knowledge items are irretrievable), and would be required
to recall the knowledge (or seek it from the environment) when required.
The second type of explanation for suboptimal human performance revolves around
the accuracy of the mental models constructed during the task. For the DSF task, such
a mental model will consist of a representation of the variables and their values, given
relationships between variables, and hypotheses about relationships not given. The DSF
task environment inputs the six variables (EI, EO, UI, UO, CL, and GL) to the ACT-R
model directly as numerical values and the mental model of their relationships is embodied
primarily in the set of numerical calculations employed by the model to compute the values
of the declarative knowledge elements.
Although we believe that the mental model we have hypothesised is a reasonably
accurate characterisation of that used by most human participants, for the sake of simplicity
and in order to allow us to focus on strategic considerations, the various numerical
calculations and comparisons carried out by the current model were not implemented using
cognitive mechanisms (i.e., memory retrievals or production based computations), but were
simply implemented as Lisp code in productions. A more ne-grained model would replace
these substitute functions with more plausible psychological mechanisms.
The third proposed explanation for suboptimal human performance relates to the
strategies employed to complete DDM tasks. In ACT-R models, problem solving strategies
are represented by the control structure embodied in the model's production rule set. A
single model may contain productions to allow several strategies for the same task with
the goal of the modelling enterprise being to use ACT-R's production rule utility learning
mechanism to account for the learning and selection of dierent strategies over the course
of problem solving (e.g., Lovett and Anderson, 1996, 2005).
The generally close t of the model to the human data in the developmental conditions
suggests that the strategy we have proposed is a reasonable rst start and a good basis
for further elaboration. It is probably not the only strategy available however and it may
well be the case that alternative strategies were used by some of the participants|or that
participants switched or modied strategies during the course of the experiment. One
possible option for extending the current model therefore is to explore alternative strategies,
implement them as ACT-R productions, test them as independent hypotheses, or combine
them in a single model and let them compete for adoption using ACT-R's production rule
utility learning mechanisms.
By using more of ACT-R's architectural mechanisms, the three options for extending
the current model outlined above add further psychological constraints on the proposed
explanation and, because they reduce the explicit control of the modeller, provide a
more rigorous test of the architecture (one of the primary aims of the DSF challenge).
In most cases the number of productions|and time|required to complete the task
would increase, as would the likelihood of retrieval failures and errors (together with
additional recalculations and search strategies required to obtain the information from the
environment).
Such considerations of model accuracy and veracity could be taken even further by
requiring the model to interact with the task environment at the eye movement, mouse
movement and key-press level|an approach increasingly adopted by ACT-R modellers
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investigating interactive behaviour (e.g., Fleetwood and Byrne, 2006; Peebles and Cheng,
2003; Salvucci, 2006).
The question remains however, to what extent the current model would need to be
modied in order to explain the transfer data. Although we have yet to test this, we believe
that the performance of the model in a number of the transfer conditions is close enough
to the human data to suggest that signicant improvements to the t could be achieved
by relatively minor adjustments to parts of the model (e.g., the number of previous time
periods taken into account) rather than a major revision of the proposed strategy. This
assumes that the same factors are applicable to all of the scenarios being modelled, or at
least that they are suciently similar that they can be captured in a single model that is
not so general as to provide little psychological insight.
It may be the case, however, that more radical extensions to the current model in
the ways outlined above are necessary in order to able to account for the transfer data
adequately, for example by having a model that learns to adopt the best solution from a
number of competing strategies and mental models. This approach would no doubt provide
useful insights but suers from the criticism that alternative strategies are simply being
added in a post-hoc fashion by the modeller. Ultimately the optimal strategy for a model
may be one in which one or more hypotheses are formed, tested, updated or abandoned
during the course of the task.
The DSF challenge is an important and valuable exercise which should be lauded for its
aims. In setting competitive opportunities for model comparison, modellers from dierent
traditions and backgrounds are able to test their assumptions and methods against a set
of external, objective criteria. The format of this challenge (model a given data set, test
against novel, unseen data sets) also forces modellers to address the tension in modelling
between the aims of specicity and closeness of t to observed data and the generality of
the model's assumptions.
To maximise the benet of such endeavours in the future, however, it may be
the case that a broader approach to model evaluation has to be taken, rather than
simple closeness of t as measured by R2 and RMSE. Although these measures are
useful as objective, quantitative criteria for assessing the relationship between model
predictions and behavioural observations (cf. Roberts and Pashler, 2000), a more protable
(although admittedly more costly and time-consuming) enterprise would be to develop more
sophisticated criteria for model evaluation in terms of the theoretical insight they provide
about the task and the architecture used.
If R2 and RMSE are used as the sole criteria for model comparison, there is a danger
that models will be produced that simply optimise these measures (while neglecting other
factors such as parsimony) rather than models that provide genuine psychological insight.
As this is antithetical to the long term aims of such challenges, we would argue that more
appropriate criteria for conceptual understanding of human performance are necessary.
For example, in the DSF challenge, the organisers could have identied a number of
qualitative features of human performance such as `an initial overlling of the tank before
stabilising at the target' in the linear conditions; or `a repeating larger overll, return
to target, smaller overll, return to target pattern' in the S4 condition and then assessed
whether models showed these general features (irrespective of the exact quantity of water in
the tank) as the criteria of success instead of (or more likely as well as) the other quantitative
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measures. Subsequently, as models improve and they all start to meet the initial goal of
demonstrating the general features of human data, R2 and RMSE would presumably become
more important as criteria.
These additional criteria may make it harder to identify a clear `winner' but if the goal of
such challenges is to work towards greater conceptual understanding then it may be found
that several models are equal in terms of the insight they provide. This could, of course,
take a longer time to assess than is typically set for such challenges and may only be known
after further testing, comparison or integration. However the benets of such an evaluation
may far outweigh these costs.
This challenge has been a valuable exercise, progressing the tradition of earlier modelling
challenges, and we hope that it will encourage and provide a useful example for future
challenges. We also hope that the models entered into the challenge provide further insights
into the DSF task and be of long-term benet to the organisers. If lessons can also be learned
from the challenge in terms of how models can be evaluated then the enterprise will have
been doubly valuable, with consequences that have a long-term benet for the cognitive
modelling community.
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